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Abstract Two apparently disparate phenomena of defec-
tive body integrity are reviewed. The Wrst concerns dysme-
lia, characterized by the congenital absence or deformation
of limbs, and the focus of the review is on phantom sensa-
tions of people with this kind of physical integrity disorder.
The second phenomenon consists of non-psychotic individ-
uals’ desire to have a healthy limb amputated, which is
interpreted as a mismatch between the physical integrity of
a particular limb and its representation in multimodal corti-
cal areas of the brain. We outlined commonalities and
diVerences between the two conditions and note the
absence, in both areas of research, of a uniWed theory that
would account for the reported phenomenology. Phantom
limbs in dysmelia and the desire for limb amputation most
likely are the consequence of very early developmental dis-
sociations between physical and phenomenal body shapes.
They are mirror images of one another in that the former
constitutes an “animation without incarnation” and, the
latter, an “incarnation without animation”.
Keywords Body integrity identity disorder (BIID) · 
Paraphilias · Parietal lobes · Body image · Body schema · 
Borderlands of psychiatry and neurology
Introduction
This paper examines two apparently disparate phenomena of
corporeal awareness. In both, the completeness or integrity
of one’s own body is hampered. The Wrst is the occurrence
of phantom limbs in individuals born with an “incomplete”
body, in which the physical body is incomplete, but the
missing limb seems to be represented in the subject’s brain,
at least as can be inferred from its phenomenal presence.
The second phenomenon is the strong desire, by non-psy-
chotic and otherwise well-adjusted healthy individuals, to
have a fully functional limb removed. In this condition, it
can be argued that despite the physical presence of a limb,
the lack of acceptance is due to some underrepresentation in
the subject’s brain. We review the literature on both condi-
tions and propose that phantom sensations of physically
absent limbs and the request for removal of normally devel-
oped extremities may be mirror images of one another on
the conceptual level: an animation without incarnation and
an incarnation without animation, respectively.
Animation without incarnation: phantom sensations 
of congenitally absent limbs
Dysmelia is a heterogenous condition aVecting the physical
integrity of the body (O’Rahilly 1951; O’Rahilly and
Gardner 1975). It involves a deWcit in limb formation
caused by genetic or developmental factors that results in a
deformation of arms or legs. In cases of a complete absence
of skeletal parts, the term “amelia” is used. In general, limb
reduction deWcits are the result of an arrest of formation of
the embryonic limb buds during early fetal development
(prior to the 8th week of gestation in the case of amelia) or
of later vascular, mechanical or teratogenic incidents (see
Froster-Iskenius and Baird 1990 for review). Amelia of one
or more limbs occurs with a frequency of 1.5 per 100,000
live births. While upper and lower limbs are aVected com-
parably often, there is a preponderance of left-sided over
right-sided defects (unless they are thalidomide-induced;
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with the physical aspects of limb reduction defects, but
with the observation that a minority of individuals, who
show such defects, report phantom sensations of the con-
genitally absent limb (henceforth referred to as “congenital
phantoms”).
To our knowledge, the physiologist Gabriel Gustav
Valentin (1810–1883) was the Wrst to systematically ques-
tion persons with dysmelia about phantoms of their missing
limbs (Valentin 1836). During both his and more modern
times the investigative focus of phantom limb research was
almost exclusively on phantom limbs after amputation
(Finger and Hustwit 2003; Halligan 2002). Valentin
explored whether phantom sensations (he used the term
“feelings of integration”) were observed in persons born
with incomplete bodies because he doubted the validity of
theories that conceptualized such sensations as the brain’s
“sensorimotor memories” of once owned limbs. SpeciW-
cally, he hoped “to deWnitely falsify the view that the inte-
gration would rely on certain memories of sensation”
(p. 330). He presented case studies of four persons born
with one incomplete upper limb, who all reported phantom
sensations qualitatively comparable to those described by
amputees. For instance, one 19-year-old girl born without a
left hand (shortened metacarpal bones, but no phalanges)
noted the phantom presence of a regular palm including all
Wve Wngers. Valentin was not satisWed by this purely sub-
jective report and tried to “objectify” it by administering
several behavioral tasks. For instance, he provoked pares-
thesias in some of the phantom Wngers by prolonged pres-
sure on certain nerves in the stump. As the pattern of
innervation in the Wngers could not be known by his sub-
jects, the fact that tingling sensations were elicited in the
“correct” phantom Wngers was taken as evidence for the
genuineness of the reported phantoms.
Valentin also designed a length estimation task, later re-
invented for the same purpose by other authors (Weinstein
and Sersen 1961). Using the normally developed limb as a
reference, subjects were required to indicate the length of
the phantoms of their missing limbs. Repeated measure-
ments allowed a systematic determination of the size and
shape of reported phantoms. On the basis of these observa-
tions, Valentin concluded that “[the integration of sensa-
tion] by persons born with limb dysplasia teaches us that it
is out of the question that they could be accounted for by
memory or recollective imagery” (Valentin 1836, p. 334).
He speculated about the potential mechanisms of phantom
sensations in the four individuals studied, emphasizing that
peripheral and central nervous system factors were proba-
bly involved. Interestingly, Valentin was quick to caution
scientists not to accept his speculations as “an axiom, i.e.,
the beginning of our ignorance or the borderlines of our
knowledge” (p. 334). It turned out that his concerns were
entirely unjustiWed. His study was to remain unnoticed for
more than a century, and it was the axiom he had set out to
question (i.e., the view of previous limb use as a necessary
precondition for phantom sensations) that was about to gain
popularity in the decades to follow.
A paper by a Czech neurologist, Arnold Pick (1851–
1924), was most inXuential for the preservation of this
axiom. In an overview on pathologies of corporeal aware-
ness, Pick (1915) emphasized the continuous reconstruction
of a central representation of one’s own body, the “body
schema”, during child development. He equated phantom
sensations in amputees with an activation of these central
engravings: the physical part could be lost, but its represen-
tation would persist. In this context, he rather parentheti-
cally mentioned the following statement of aVairs:
“… the absence of the phantoms discussed here in
cases of congenital [aplasia] or after amputation expe-
rienced during early childhood. The amputated part
has simply never been represented in the body
schema of these particular persons” (p. 260).
Although Pick authoritatively labeled this statement a
“fact”, his text contained no reference either to his own
empirical observations or to any published data on people
with congenital limb deWciencies. Only a casual note,
Pick’s (1915) publication was quickly adopted as the key
reference to document the non-existence of phantoms in
individuals born with absent limbs. Simmel (1956, 1961)
later helped to spread Pick’s reference to the English lan-
guage literature, even though she herself had recognized
that Pick’s statement was not based on observation
(Simmel 1966). Still today, the notion of phantom limbs
occurring exclusively after amputation acquired during
adulthood or late childhood is widely and unquestionably
accepted. We believe that the rarity of the condition is
responsible for the persistence of this axiom. Furthermore,
as dysmelia occurs in various types and degrees, the forma-
tion of a proposed theory depended considerably on the
type of limb deWciencies an author had investigated. We
critically discuss several hypothetical mechanisms pub-
lished in the rather scattered twentieth century literature on
congenital phantom limbs (Table 1).
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs as the product 
of wishful thinking and suggestibility
Sohn (1914), apparently unaware of Valentin’s (1836) con-
tribution, reported the case of a 19-year-old woman born
without a left forearm and hand, who complained about
painful sensations in her missing hand and Wngers. He
noticed the theoretical signiWcance of this observation, but
was unwilling to even speculate about any sensory, motor
or representational mechanisms that could have accounted123
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ferred to point out that the “only mildly erotic” girl might
have considered the lack of physical body integrity a barrier
to marriage and therefore assumed “that the subjective sen-
sation of pain in the Wngers and the consciousness of a hand
are equivalent to a wish-fulWllment” (p. 961). The notion of
wish-fulWllment on the part of the examiner was considered
by Skoyles (1990), who raised concerns about general sug-
gestibility eVects shaping a patient’s response to questions
about phantom sensations. These concerns appear espe-
cially warranted as they addressed observations in children
with congenital limb deWciencies (e.g., Poeck 1964, 1969;
Simmel 1961; Weinstein and Sersen 1961; Weinstein et al.
1964). Skoyles emphasized the high vulnerability of child
testimony to leading questions and situational demands,
including the “length estimation game” to obtain measure-
ments of the size and shape of a phantom.
Although we appreciate the recommendation to maintain
a critical attitude when confronted with spontaneous claims
about unusual experiences, or if questioning subjects about
such experiences, we believe that some measures could
have been taken to substantiate or invalidate an individual’s
claim. Valentin’s (1836) selective provocation of paresthe-
sias in some, but not other, phantom Wngers is one simple,
but eVective, way to “objectify” an individual’s report
about phantom Wngers. Another way is to ask about pos-
tural properties of claimed phantom limbs, especially when
their characteristic physical responses are not immediately
accessible to a layperson (Fig. 1).
Also, we note that some published observations do not
substantiate of an “explanation” of congenital phantoms as
a product of wish-fulWllment. For instance, as far as Sohn’s
(1914) “mildly erotic” girl is concerned, one is tempted to
wonder whether a painful phantom could ever be the
product of wishful thinking. Likewise, the relative over-
representation of certain phantom parts over others (e.g.,
the hallux over the calf) can hardly be explained by diVer-
ential psychological needs for the diVerent body parts
(Weinstein and Sersen 1961). Moreover, gaps in the phe-
nomenal experience of a phantom (for instance, the sensa-
tion of a thumb and a little Wnger without any Wngers felt in
between) can “scarcely be considered a fantasy worth its
salt” (Weinstein and Sersen 1961, p. 909; see Ramachan-
dran 1993, for similar arguments). Finally, wishful thinking
does not need the type of mechanical trigger that often elic-
its sensations of congenitally absent limbs. Thus, superW-
cial injury to the stump induced the Wrst-ever awareness of
congenital phantoms in three out of the four cases commu-
nicated by Saadah and Melzack (1994). Similarly, Xue
(1986) treated two persons with congenital limb dysplasia
with acupuncture (for reasons unrelated to their condition).
Upon needle insertion in the stump region, two young
women born with an absent or deformed left hand felt a
sudden prolongation of the arm that took on the shape of a
regular upper limb with a hand and Wve Wngers.
To summarize the early historical development, recast-
ing subjects’ reports of concrete sensations into mere fanta-
sies marginalized the phenomenon under investigation.
Any need to adjust the theory of phantom limbs as the
brain’s sensorimotor memories thus became superXuous
and indirectly helped the axiom of the “non-existence of
congenital phantoms” to survive.
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs as motor illusions 
induced by stump movements
Simmel (1961), in one of the Wrst group studies on congen-
ital phantom limbs, interviewed 27 people with dysplasia of
Table 1 Published reports on 
phantom sensations of congeni-
tally absent or deformed limbs
References No. of congenital 
phantoms per no. of 
persons examined
Cumulative no. of 
cases with congenital 
phantom limbs
Valentin (1836), Sohn (1914), Mikorey (1952), 
Poeck (1964), Ramachandran (1993), 
Grouios (1996), Brugger et al. (2000)
1/1 each 7
Burchard (1965) 1/17 8
Boonstra et al. (2000) 1/26 9
Kooijman et al. (2000) 1/27 10
Simmel (1961) 2/27 12
Xue (1986) 2/2 14
Wilkins et al. (1998) 2/17 16
Valentin (1836) 4/4 20
Saadah and Melzack (1994) 7/75 27
Weinstein and Sersen (1961) 5/30 32
Weinstein et al. (1964) 13/71 45
Melzack et al. (1997) 15/76 60a
Not included are cases of phan-
tom limbs that Wrst occurred af-
ter major stump surgery, after 
amputations in very early child-
hood, or exclusively in night 
dreams (adopted from Brugger 
and Funk 2006; Price 2006)
a Average incidence (the seven 
single case reports 
excluded) = 16.1%123
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reported such sensations, both were 10-year-old girls.
While one of them was born with a completely absent fore-
arm (no Wnger rudiments attached to the stump), the other
was born with an incomplete hand. SpeciWcally, while a
“rudimentary thumb [was] present with some voluntary
motion” (p. 469), the Wngers were absent. Simmel dis-
missed the former girl’s report about phantom Wnger sensa-
tions as due to the suggestive nature of the interview. At the
same time, she interpreted the latter girl’s report about
Wnger phantoms (mainly of the little Wnger) as an illusory
projection of enhanced thumb motility into extracorporeal
space: “the kinesthetic stimulation resulting from such
abnormally great excursion may possibly provide a suY-
cient condition […] which, under the special circumstances
here, culminates in the experience of a ‘phantom Wnger’”
(p. 470). Simmel was probably correct in pointing out that
cases of completely absent limbs must be investigated sepa-
rately from cases with rudimentary preservation of distal
body parts attached to the stump (“intercalary aplasia”).
However, she failed to notice that her proposal was at vari-
ance with Valentin (1836), who had explicitly stated “I
have to note here that the feelings of integration are more
vivid in individuals who lack all peripheral parts, e.g., all
Wngers, than in those that are more completely organized in
this regard, i.e., who still have a thumb or thumb plus Wrst
digit” (p. 331). Thus, while Simmel’s proposal may have
some validity with respect to phantoms in individuals with
intercalary aplasia, it inevitably fails to account for the con-
genital phantoms reported by people with complete aplasia
of an entire limb.
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs derived 
from a representation of the contralateral limb
Burchard (1965) found indications of phantom sensations
in only one out of 17 cases examined (two more persons
reported having felt the congenitally absent hand during
their dreams; see also Brugger 2008; Valentin 1836). This
individual was a 36-year-old woman born with a forearm
only 9 cm long and with no hand. She occasionally felt a
prolongation of the stump, so vivid that she would touch its
physical tip to ascertain that the felt forearm was only a cre-
ation of her mind. Fifteen of Burchard’s patients had
strictly unilateral limb defects, including the woman with
the Xeeting phantom percept. The author therefore speculated
Fig. 1 One way to diminish the chances that one is duped by a dysm-
elic individual’s claims about phantom limbs is to ask about postural
details, which can hardly be faked without expert knowledge. Top
subject AZ (born without lower arms; left panel) reported that she
occasionally folded her phantom arms “as normal people do”. Folding
them on command, she indicated that the left was on top of the right
(middle panel). On being asked to fold her phantom arms “the other
way round” (i.e., to put the right on top of the left; right panel), she
immediately showed an expression of discomfort and commented that
this posture “feels extremely awkward”. Bottom drawings of hands
with the request to mimic the depicted Wnger posture and to indicate the
vividness of the resulting phantom sensation (on a seven-point scale),
AZ vividness ratings matched those of normal controls, who had to
imagine taking the shown postures. SpeciWcally, item 4 received a very
low rating (note the anatomical impossibility of a fully stretched ring
Wnger!)123
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tion about the existing limb that reached the deaVerented
cortex from homotopic areas of the contralateral hemi-
sphere. This idea was later elaborated on by Grouios
(1996), who introduced the case of a 12-year-old boy born
without a right elbow and forearm and reporting phantom
sensations of the missing hand and Wngers. He argued that
“It seems that the upper and lower limbs in people
with congenital limb deWciency are linked in the brain
as a result of frequent co-activation. Hence, sensory
input of the left upper limb, for example, projects not
only to the somatosensory cortex of the right cerebral
hemisphere but—by identiWed or unidentiWed com-
missural pathways—to mirror-symmetrical points in
the left cerebral hemisphere. It thus contributes to a
weak formation of the cortical representation of the
right upper limb.” (Grouios 1996, pp. 503–504).
The conceptualization of a congenital phantom as the
phenomenal awareness of the mirror limb is not without
experimental support from the literature on amputation
phantoms (Jacobson 1931), from reports on referred sensa-
tions from a normal to an anesthetic hand (Sathian 2000)
and from work on the crossmodal integration of somes-
thetic and visual information in limb observation tasks
(Funk and Brugger 2008). However, the generalization of
this theory is limited; clearly, it cannot account for reports
of congenital phantoms in people with bilateral absence of
upper and/or lower limbs. We emphasize that the theoreti-
cal importance of cases of bilateral limb aplasia was
already noted in this speciWc context by Valentin (1836).
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs derived 
from a schema for hand–mouth coordination
A novel theoretical contribution to the issue of congenital
phantoms was provided by Gallagher et al. (1998). These
authors suggested a very speciWc mechanism for the forma-
tion of phantom percepts in individuals with deWcient phys-
ical body integrity, i.e., the activation of an innate schema
for hand–mouth coordination. The empirical data on which
Gallagher et al.’s proposal rests come from investigations
of human fetal behavior. Not only are right upper limb pref-
erences already determined at around 10 weeks of gesta-
tion, but also the precision of hand-to-mouth movements
for thumb sucking, from their very Wrst occurrence around
week 12 (Hepper et al. 1998; 2005), suggests an innate
schema representing these movements. Gallagher et al. pro-
posed that evocation of this schema stimulating hand and
mouth simultaneously could give rise to sensations of a
hand even in the physical absence of a hand; speciWcally,
they suggested that activation of the mouth part of the
schema would always be accompanied by activation of the
hand part of the schema. “Activation of the expanded face-
representing neural map may also reactivate the indigenous
limb-representing neurons and thus cause the phantom
experience” (p. 59). We note that Gallagher et al. were the
Wrst to ground a hypothesis that an innate component of
body schema is responsible for congenital phantoms on
focal empirical Wndings. However, these authors did not
address cases of phantoms in persons with congenitally
absent lower limbs. In fact, their tabular overview of pub-
lished reports on congenital phantoms meticulously and
comprehensively lists cases of upper limb phantoms
(explained by their theory) but omits cases of congenital
phantoms of legs and feet, even if these had been described
by the same original authors. Hence, this theory may have
its merits, but it clearly cannot account for all observational
data from the clinical literature on congenital phantoms.
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs as manifestations 
of an innate body schema
The strongest conclusion from cases of congenital phan-
toms is that “… a structural basis for the phantom experi-
ence is encoded in the DNA. We are born with a full-blown
potential for imaging body parts” (Abramson and Feibel
1981, p. 99). In more moderate terms, a genetically built-in
component for a body schema was described by Melzack
(1990; Melzack et al. 1997). According to this author, a
widespread network of thalamocortical and limbic loops
(the “neuromatrix”) is basically innate, but continuously
shaped during a person’s life by sensory inputs and motor
commands. The concept of a neuromatrix is not only com-
patible with reports of phantom sensations of physically not
developed limbs, but also could explain phenomena of neu-
ral migration and the synchronized early development of
physically separated brain areas (Melzack 1990). However,
we would like to add that agreement about the genuineness
of congenital phantoms does not automatically imply
agreement about a genetic basis of corporeal awareness.
Even if an infant’s congenital phantoms could ever be
“objectiWed” a few moments after birth, this should not nec-
essarily be taken as evidence for a genetic hardwiring of a
four-limbed body; “innate” must not be equated with
“genetically determined”. In fact, as pointed out above, the
human fetus shows remarkably rich motor behavior (e.g.,
McCartney and Hepper 1999), possibly accompanied by
corresponding sensory impressions. A central representa-
tion of the body could at least theoretically be built on this
richness of very early intrauterine life, even if the motor
commands have not emerged from cortical, but spinal, cen-
ters. Note that most cases of impaired body integrity
(i.e., of dysmelia) are not caused by genetic defects, but by
unspeciWed “accidents”, involving limb amputation, during
embryogenesis. We suggest that explanations for unequal123
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well as for left and right limbs (Table 2) may ultimately be
found in the “laws” governing fetal development—such as
the slightly earlier development of upper compared to
lower limbs (O’Rahilly and Gardner 1975) and the diVeren-
tial vascularization of left and right limb buds (Bouwes
Bavinck and Weaver 1986). With respect to this laterality
issue, we note the surprisingly low interest by embryolo-
gists, teratologists and developmental neuroscientist in this
issue and plead for a closer collaboration across the diVer-
ent medical and psychological disciplines. Fetal determina-
tion of congenital phantom limbs is also considered in the
four-component theory introduced by Price (2006). This
thoughtful theory oVers an alternative to the genetic hard-
wiring of body form by delineating the importance of pre-
natal and postnatal factors, the incorporation of prostheses,
and visual factors related to the observation of other people
moving their limbs.
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs as manifestations 
of the human mirror system
There is anecdotal evidence for phantom sensations being
triggered by the observation of other people moving their
limbs, both in cases of traumatic amputation (Henderson
and Smyth 1948) and congenital limb deWciency (Melzack
et al. 1997). A woman born without arms and legs described
how visually observing her sister’s movements could evoke
feeling these movements as if they were her own:
“Ever since Deb could walk she was taking care of
me. I saw her body move from childhood’s awkward-
ness to adult gracefulness and strength. But not only
did I see this, I felt her movements. In a sense, part of
her body (the part I lacked on the exterior) was mine
too…” (Frank 1986, p. 191).
Extensive work with a woman born without forearms
and legs (AZ; 44 years old at the time of testing; see Fig. 1)
led us to suggest that the visual observation of limb move-
ments could be an important factor in the genesis of con-
genital phantoms (Brugger et al. 2000). AZ reports that she
has been aware of a complete body for as long as she can
remember. SpeciWcally, she provided vividness ratings of
diVerent body parts that indicated greater awareness for
hands and feet compared to lower arms and lower legs, and
also seemed to reXect “right-handedness”. Not all toes were
experienced, and on being shown pictures of hands and ask
to adopt their Wnger postures, she could not imitate all pos-
tures depicted (Fig. 1). In a paradigm investigating “appar-
ent motion of body parts” (ShiVrar and Freyd 1990), we
compared AZ’s performance with that of CL, a 43-year-old
journalist born without arms, but who had never experi-
enced any phantom sensations (Funk et al. 2005). In this
paradigm, what is seen is determined by what can be per-
formed with one’s limbs. With hand stimuli, AZ showed
the same Xash rate-dependent perception of short versus
long apparent motion trajectories as did control individuals
with limbs, while CL perceived the short, anatomically
impossible trajectories at all interstimulus intervals. It thus
Table 2 Similarities and diVerences between the condition of congenital phantoms and the desire for amputation
Selected key references document the respective points of similarity explicitly
a For phantom sensations a consequence of a higher incidence of left-sided dysmelia, in general, at least for upper limbs (e.g., Simmel 1961,
footnote 6)
Phantom sensations 
of congenitally absent limbs
Desire for amputation (BIID)
Commonalities
May be underreported (reluctance 
to mention the condition)
Abramson and Feibel (1981), 
Scatena (1990)
Fisher and Smith (2000), 
Braam et al. (2006)
First manifestation early in life Melzack et al. (1997) First (2005)
Bias in favor of left-sided limbsa Price (2006) Brugger (2007)
Visual triggering of sensation/desire reported Frank (1986), Melzack et al. (1997) Blanke et al. (2009), Kasten (2009)
Cortical correlates of condition demonstrated Brugger et al. (2000) Brang et al. (2008), McGeoch et al. (2009)
No unifying theory formulated Brugger and Funk (2006), Price (2006) Kasten (2009), Müller (2008)
Major diVerences
Gender bias Absent More frequent in men
Upper versus lower extremities More frequent for arms More frequent for legs
SuVering Absent Present
Sexual component Absent May be present
Obsessive–compulsive component Absent Often present
Stability of aVected limb Stable May shift123
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hands was more decisive for the performance in this task
than was the physical development of these body parts.
More recent research with two aplasic individuals explicitly
investigated the reorganization of the human mirror system
in the absence of hands (Gazzola et al. 2007). In an fMRI
experiment, these subjects and normally limbed control
subjects observed a series of hand actions. Compared to a
static observation condition, hand movement observation
activated major components of the fronto-parieto-temporal
mirror system also in the amelic participants. However,
there was a matching of visual observation and action goals
rather than eVector-speciWc execution; that is, visual obser-
vation of hand movements led to robust activations of corti-
cal regions involved in the planning and execution of
mouth and foot movements. While experiments such as the
one by Gazzola et al. (2007) are indispensable for the
understanding of the plasticity of the mirror system, they do
not tell us about the genesis of congenital phantoms (the
authors do not report whether or not their two amelic partic-
ipants reported phantom sensations). What is of key interest
is a potentially diVerential reorganization pattern for those
(few) amelic persons with phantom experiences compared
to those without. This holds not only for the mirror system
in particular, but also for any reorganizational process,
whether structural (e.g., Funk et al. 2008; Gowers 1878;
Nordmann and Lindemann 1940; Stoeckel et al. 2005) or
functional (e.g., Cruz et al. 2003; Hamzei et al. 2001), and
notably also for cases with an acquired loss of a limb
(Giummarra et al. 2007).
Phantoms of congenitally absent limbs: a concluding note
The Wrst part of this review dealt with an aspect of body
integrity, which may be exceptional, but is not pathologi-
cal per se. While the physical deWcit itself, the absence or
deformation of one or several limbs, clearly does reXect a
pathological development, the “sensation of integrations”
(Valentin 1836) experienced by those reporting congeni-
tal phantoms are “as if” experiences, clearly without any
delusional coloring. The case of congenital phantoms is
highly illustrative from a philosophy-of-science perspec-
tive. The non-recognition of the phenomenon as a “scien-
tiWc fact” (Fleck 1935/1979; see Brugger and Funk 2006,
for discussion) is still ongoing and in stark contrast to the
considerable though scattered literature documenting its
existence.
In the second part of our review, we discuss a phenom-
enon that shares as many similarities with the sensation
of physically not developed limbs as it shows diVerences.
It is the desire, by non-psychotic individuals, to have a
fully functional, physically normally developed limb
amputated.
Incarnation without animation: the desire for healthy 
limb amputation (“body integrity identity disorder”, 
BIID)
Toward the end of the eighteenth century, a French surgeon
was contacted by an Englishman, who asked that one of his
legs be removed. The surgeon Wrst refused to comply, but
was soon forced to proceed at gunpoint: “… against his
will, the surgeon separated the leg from the body, which
had Wtted perfectly, but had been proscribed by a very par-
ticular fantasy” (Sue 1785, p. 222). Ironically, the English-
man had himself Wtted for a prosthesis, returned to England
and sent the surgeon 250 guineas by mail. The accompany-
ing letter contained words of thanks for having removed “a
limb which put an invincible obstacle to my happiness”
(p. 223).
By reporting this anecdote (see also Johnston and Elliott
2002), we want to argue against the view that the desire for
healthy limb amputation would constitute “a new way to be
mad” (Baubet et al. 2007; Elliott 2000) or an internet-prop-
agated bizarreness. In fact, educated discussions concern-
ing the preoccupation with amputation of one or more of
one’s limbs have been around for more than 100 years.
They Wrst surfaced in the early literature on fetishism and
sexual paraphilias (von KraVt-Ebing 1886/1965). The
emphasis was thus on the erotic component of the desire,
present in disorders like “apotemnophilia”, that is, the pri-
marily sexually motivated wish to become an amputee
(Money et al. 1977) or “acrotomophilia”, i.e., the sexual
preference for amputee partners (Money and Simcoe 1984/
1986; see Bruno 1997, for a taxonomy of what he called
“factitious disability disorder”). Despite the view that an
erotic or sexual component may always be part of the desire
for amputation (Elliott 2000; First 2005), our own work
with aVected persons (Blanke et al. 2009; unpublished
observations) indicates that there is a “pure form” of ampu-
tation desire, not less intense and longstanding, but rela-
tively uncontaminated by aspects related to sexual identity.
Individuals presenting with this pure form typically state
that they feel “overcomplete” with four limbs, that the
image of themselves does not Wnd a reXection in the body
they feel trapped in, or simply that the limb they do not
identify with is felt as a nuisance or an annoying appendage
to their body. Very typically, there is a clear and stable
demarcation line between “accepted” and “rejected” areas
of a limb.
First (2005) provided the Wrst large-scale study on “an
unusual dysfunction in the development of one’s funda-
mental sense of anatomical (body) identity” (p. 919) and
for which he proposed the term “BIID”. Telephone inter-
views with 52 aVected persons without a history of mania,
delusions or hallucinations revealed the following pattern
(see Table 2): more than 90% were men; age of onset was123
322 Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:315–326“overwhelmingly during childhood or early adolescence”
(p. 924); the amputation desire concerned major limbs
rather than single Wngers or toes; those individuals desiring
a single leg amputation outnumbered those wanting an arm
amputation (38 vs. 7 individuals, all bilateral amputation
desires concerned legs); left-sided limbs were more often
aVected (55%) than right-sided limbs (27%); individuals
were not psychotic and their desire diVered from the
psychotically motivated urge to perform self-mutilations;
co-morbid psychopathology was unremarkable, mainly
consisting of mild symptoms of anxiety or depression. In a
recent study, we have conWrmed the general pattern of these
Wndings (Blanke et al. 2009) and proposed an interpretation
in neurological terms.
The neurological basis of BIID
SpeciWcally, we have suggested that BIID reXects a dis-
turbed integration of multisensory limb information into a
coherent cerebral representation of one’s own body as a
whole (Blanke et al. 2009). A phenomenologically similar
disturbance in neuropsychiatric patients is asomatognosia
(Arzy et al. 2006; Dieguez et al. 2007), the feeling that a
body part is absent or has disappeared from corporeal
awareness. Also related may be somatoparaphrenia (Bottini
et al. 2002; Gerstmann 1942), the experience of a disowner-
ship of body parts contralateral to a unilateral lesion,
mostly of the right hemisphere (see Vallar and Ronchi
2009, for a recent overview). Still another condition which
at least superWcially resembles BIID is misoplegia, deWned
as the hatred of paralyzed limbs that involves cursing at and
physical aggression toward a limb (Critchley 1974). We
have shown that misoplegia is by no means conWned to the
presence of a paresis (Loetscher et al. 2006), but as a rule
the targets of self-aggression are left-sided body parts
(Brugger 2007). Other authors have linked Cotard delusion,
which is the conviction that one is dead and one’s body has
rotted (Berrios and Luque 1995), to the integrity disorder
underlying the desire for amputation (Carruthers 2007,
2008). The qualitative similarities between BIID and these
neurological disorders of corporeal awareness suggest that
the parietal lobes, especially the multisensory integration
areas of the right superior parietal lobule, may be involved.
SpeciWcally, we postulated a “disturbed integration of mul-
tisensory information of the aVected body parts into a
coherent cerebral representation of one’s own body”
(Blanke et al. 2009) as triggering the amputation desire.
The aVected limb may be entirely functional, yet lack the
sort of animation (“Beseelung”, in German) we usually feel
to be an intrinsic property of any part of our own body.
Recently, this de-animated state of a limb, whose ampu-
tation is desired, was demonstrated experimentally. McGeoch
et al. (2009) used magnetoencephalography while three
individuals with a desire for unilateral leg amputation were
touched on the left and the right foot. While in control sub-
jects touch elicited a reliable response in the right superior
parietal lobule, irrespective of the body side stimulated, in
the three persons with BIID the same region was activated
upon touch of the normally integrated foot, but it remained
silent upon touch of the critical, “unwanted” foot. In one
additional participant, who wanted to have both legs ampu-
tated, tactile stimulation to neither foot was accompanied
by above-threshold right parietal activation. We note that
these observations have not yet been subject to the regular
peer review process, and further substantiation of these
Wndings seems therefore advisable. Other empirical evi-
dence for a neurological basis of amputation desire comes
from the same research group. Brang et al. (2008) applied
pinprick stimulation both proximal and distal to the demar-
cation line on the legs of two persons suVering from BIID.
In both cases, distal stimuli elicited an increased electroder-
mal response compared to proximal stimuli (and to pin-
pricks of the accepted leg in the subject who wanted a
unilateral amputation). No comparable diVerences between
analogous locations were found in control subjects. The
magnitude of the electrodermal response is a reliable indi-
cator of sympathetic arousal and is under control of right
anterior and limbic circuits (Critchley 2002). Brang et al.
(2008) thus interpreted the observed increase in the electro-
dermal response as the consequence of a dysfunctional
superior parietal lobule, which had never learned to inte-
grate (normally received) somatosensory signals from the
periphery into a higher-order body representation. A further
potential link between BIID and parietal lobe function was
pointed out by Ramachandran and McGeoch (2007a), who
speculated that caloric vestibular stimulation (speciWcally
left-ear cold water irrigation) could be used to treat BIID by
activation of right parietal projection areas of the vestibular
system. In fact, somatoparaphrenic delusions can be tempo-
rarily abolished by this procedure (Bisiach et al. 1991), but
vestibular stimulation is very unlikely to ever “heal” BIID,
as it is well known that its eVects on bodily awareness
vanish as soon as the nystagmoid response has ceased.
BIID and related identity disorders and conditions 
of self-directed aggression
The metaphor of “the wrong body”, before being used in
connection with BIID, was created to illustrate the suVering
of people with gender identity disorder (GID). Both GID
and BIID are characterized by a profound discontent with
actual embodiment; in both, the desire arises to surgically
change the current body state. Simulation of the desired
identity state occurs in BIID (“pretending” behavior; Bruno
1997) and GID (“crossdressing”; Schrock and Reid 2006),
and there may be a sexual attraction to persons with the123
Exp Brain Res (2010) 204:315–326 323target embodiment (the apotemnophilia component in the
case of BIID). For a comprehensive review of these and
other commonalities, see Lawrence (2006).While neurosci-
entists’ relative neglect of issues relating to sexuality has
been lamented (Herbert 2008), the few focal attempts to
elucidate the brain bases of gender identity deserve to be
laudably mentioned, especially as they are highly relevant
for the neurological understanding of BIID as well. Rama-
chandran and McGeoch (2007b, 2008) set out to determine
the incidence of phantom penis sensations in male-to-
female transsexuals after sex reassignment surgery. They
found it to be roughly 30% (6/20), i.e., only about half the
Wgure of 58% reported in the literature on post-penectomy
phantoms in men without GID. Even more surprising were
the Wndings of a similar survey conducted in female-to-
male transsexuals before the desired operation. Eighteen of
the 29 persons questioned reported phantom penis experi-
ences (while none of 10 control women did). Together,
these observations form strong support for the view that
“female-to-male transsexuals do (at least in some respects)
possess a man’s brain in a woman’s body and that the con-
verse is true for male-to-female transsexuals” (Ramachan-
dran and McGeoch 2008, p. 14). They also support our
notion of BIID as an “incarnation without animation”, or a
negative phantom limb experience.
Among the conditions not usually regarded as an identity
disorder is “compulsive targeted self-injurious behavior”
(SIB), mostly described in people suVering from neuro-
pathic pain (Mailis 1996). As in BIID, speciWc, circum-
scribed target areas on the body are identiWed by those
committing SIB (as compared to general, non-directed
forms of self-mutilation). Viewed as the human equivalent
of animal autotomy (Mailis 1996), the disorder postulates a
lack of mental representation of the body part against which
physical self-aggression is directed (Lewis et al. 2007). The
use of the term “autotomy” in these contexts was criticized
by Wilkie et al. (2007), because in zoology it has already a
precise and delimited meaning (i.e., self-detachment of a
limb), and unlike self-mutilation, the phenomenon is adap-
tive. Nevertheless, conceived of as “mental autotomy”
(Brugger 2007; Bilikiewicz 1969 used the term “autotomia
imaginaria”), the desire of amputation receives a broader
conceptualization, extending it to the Weld of general verte-
brate behavior. A comprehensive listing of the desire (and
realization) of body modiWcations less incisive than limb
amputation can be found in the monograph by Kasten
(2006).
Observations not readily compatible with BIID as a deWcit 
in limb representation
Although we have ourselves propagated dysfunction of the
right parietal lobe as implicated in the genesis of BIID
(Brugger 2007; Blanke et al. 2009), and others have pro-
vided textbook like empirical illustrations of such a dys-
function (McGeoch et al. 2009), we would like to add a
word of caution as to the general validity of the “parietal
cortex theory” of BIID. Several observations are at variance
even with a moderate version of this theory, acknowledging
that widely distributed networks between the parietal lobes
and other cortical and subcortical structures are involved.
The Wrst is the documentation of a change in the desire such
as the exceptional shift from wanting a left leg removed to
desiring removal of the right (Kasten 2009; Kasten and
Stirn 2009). Another observation not readily compatible
with the traditional neurological account of BIID concerns
those (minority) cases of the disorder, in which amputation
of a target limb does not bring about the desired relief, and
a new amputation desire suddenly develops for a previously
well-integrated limb (e.g., Berger et al. 2005). The case
communicated by Sorene et al. (2006) is exemplary in this
respect (Fig. 2); a 51-year-old non-psychotic civil servant
was seen by the authors after having cut his left forearm
with an axe. The compulsive desire to have this body part
removed newly emerged after several other forced or self-
conducted amputations of other limbs, starting with the
amputation of the right leg 10 years before. Although rather
atypical, this case illustrates that there is still a need for a
unifying theory of BIID, which accounts for the broad vari-
ability in individual symptoms. We note, however, that in
defense of the theory of a defective parietal lobe, it is still
possible that a (sub)cortical dysregulation of corporeal
awareness could be the cause of an amputation desire for
Fig. 2 Even if atypical, this case of a man in his early 50s illustrates
that theories of BIID unilaterally focusing on a failed integration of a
particular limb cannot account for all clinical shades of the disorder.
After having forced an amputation of the right leg, satisfying the initial
desire for amputation, a new desire arose, this time targeting the right
little Wnger. Later the desire for amputation spread to the little Wnger
and then to the ring Wnger of the left hand, and ultimately to the whole
forearm. After Sorene et al. (2006), Fig. 2 reprinted with permission123
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known that the right parietal lobe is generally dominant for
the attribution of a proper “sense of self” to single body
parts, whether left-sided or right-sided (Tsakiris et al.
2008). Thus, amputation at one body site might bring about
a transient relief of the desire for amputation, but qualmish
feelings about one’s body integrity may later reoccur, and
target a body part at a diVerent site and even side.1
On the other hand, observations like the one reported by
Sorene et al. (2006) are also compatible with the view that
BIID reXects a general desire for reaching a disabled state
(Baubet et al. 2007; Kasten 2009), and that limb speciWcity
is rather secondary. In line with this view are reports about
variants of BIID in which the amputation of a limb would
be abhorred, but a state of sensory loss is desired instead
(desire for paraplegia; Kasten 2009; desire for deafness:
Veale 2006).
Finally, the fact that persons with BIID, who succeeded
in realizing the desired amputation, do report phantom
limbs (Kasten 2006, p. 165; own unpublished observation)
seems to speak against a life-long lack of animation of the
lost limb. However, it would be unwise to assume that
decades of limb use would not have left traces in the brain.
Clearly, more research is needed to assess the vividness and
persistence of phantom sensations after desired compared
to undesired amputation. A Wrst hint in favor of the view of
BIID as a “negative phantom” phenomenon is found in the
dream reports of persons having had the desired amputa-
tion. Compared with published Wgures for traumatic ampu-
tees (reviewed in Brugger 2008), the time until an
individual dreams of being amputated is much shorter after
a desired amputation (unpublished observations).
BIID: a concluding note
Body integrity identity disorder poses fundamental prob-
lems to medicine, psychology, ethics and the law. From a
medical perspective, there is no consensus on what causes
the desire for amputation. Currently, BIID is not listed in
the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorder
(DSM-IV-TR), and its prevalence, diagnostic classiWcation
and potential treatments are unknown or controversial.
There is a remarkable upsurge of ethical discussions about
how to cope with the amputation requests of a rapidly
growing community of people avowing themselves to
BIID. While the ethical aspects of GID are relatively clear,
those concerning BIID are a matter of fervent debate
(Müller 2008 and associated open peer commentary).
With regard to the many open questions surrounding BIID,
Johnston and Elliott (2002, p. 435) concluded: “We believe
that the proper response to people who wish to have healthy
limbs amputated will not become clear until much more is
known about the nature of the condition itself.” We hope
that the present review will sensitize clinicians and
researchers to recognize a phenomenon, whose understand-
ing may not only lead to novel insights about how the
brain mediates the experience of an embodied self, but
also whose investigation will necessarily help in bridging
the many gaps that still exist between neurology and
psychiatry.
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